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NOTES
clearly erroneous. The very nature of the process involves ascribing to
the courts the duty of deciding when these freedoms may be validly
abridged. The balancing of interests is merely a means by which the
court renders a policy decision without the benefit of any concrete norms.
However, the balancing of interests process could serve as a method
of determining the validity of compelling testimony if the courts recog-
nize that: To compel testimony in response to questions which concern
the exercise of First Amendment freedoms may abridge these rights;
the governmental interest in Congressional investigations may be much
greater than that in legislation which directly abridges the First Amend-
ment. However, the individual interest here includes the public interest
in the First Amendment and is, thus, also correspondingly increased.
With these two working principles before them, the courts might be able
to deal adequately with this problem, with a view towards eventually
establishing ascertainable limits to the Congressional power of inquiry
when compelling testimony.
Of course, the better solution to the entire problem would be for
Congress to recognize the results of some of its current practices and by
self-restrictive legislation eliminate the problem at its source."" Many
recommendations have been offered to improve current Congressional
procedures in investigations which would at least partially alleviate the
danger of abridging First Amendment freedoms.4 7
U. C. C. CONTRIBUTIONS TOWARD THE ADOPTION OF
A CONTRACTUAL CONCEPT OF WARRANTIES
The law has never provided a clearly defined theory of liability
for breach of warranty.' At the time of their inception in the common
law, warranties were based on the tort action of deceit. 2 They evolved,
46. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 539-540 (1951).
47. Galloway, supra note 1. See also Meader, Limitations on Coiwressional Investi-
gation, 47 MIcE. L. REv. 775, 778 (1949); Rogers, Congressional Investigations: The
Problem and Its Solution, 18 U. OF CE. L. REv. 464 (1951) ; Stebbins, Limitations of
the Powers of Congressional Investigating Committees, 16 A.B.A.J. 425, 428 (1930).
1. This is, in part, a result of a failure to objectively evaluate the purposes of
warranties in the beginning. Fuller's comment, in relation to damages, is equally appli-
cable to the law of warranties: "We are still all too willing to embrace the conceit
that it is possible to manipulate legal concepts without the orientation which comes
from the simple inquiry: toward what end is this activity directed?" Fuller and Perdue,
The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: I, 46 YALE L.J. 52 (1936).
2. The warranty action based on deceit actually preceded the assumpsit action.
Assumpsit was originally considered a tort action but developed shortly into contract.
1 WILLISTON, SALES § 195 (3d ed. 1948).
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very shortly, into a new segment of contract law.3 Occasionally a third
concept has been utilized which declares that warranties are essentially
based on a social desire to protect the consumer.4  Under this view
they are controlled by judicially determined social policy without refer-
ence to tort or contract principles. Although it is commonly proclaimed
that warranties now constitute contractual provisions, the other con-
cepts of liability continue to be woven into warranty law.5 Fault justifi-
cation in tort law and, more recently, the doctrine of absolute liability
consistently appear in the warranty scene.6 The contractual concept
has been broadened by a more liberal application of implied promises.
In the area of social policy, a philosophy of risk avoidance, prevention,
shifting, and distribution has superseded the ancient doctrine of caveat
emptor.7 Today each of these theories facilitates imposition of increased
3. Ibid.
4. This basis of liability is asserted in some of the privity cases in order to avoid
the privity requirement. Decker and Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828
(1942). The same argument is employed in some cases in order to uphold a warranty
which the seller has attempted to disclaim. See Note, 1 VAND. L. REV. 467 (1948). A
recent casebook even suggests that all legal obligations are imposed by law, including
contract as well as tort obligations. KESSLER AND SHARP, CASES AND MATAARILS ON
CONTRACTS 56 (1953).
5. 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 195 (3d ed. 1948). The author states that even though
warranties are generally considered as contract today, the tort liability also remains.
In addition to the continued effect of tort principles on warranties, an entirely separate
branch of negligence and misrepresentation law has developed, covering the same types
of sales transactions. The difficulty in negligence recovery has been the adequate proof
of negligence. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has been utilized to a great extent
in this area, but the requirement that the injury be caused by an instrument within
the exclusive control of the defendant has hampered its effectiveness. The negligence
cases generally lead into considerations of dangerous articles. The deceit action, in
tort, has been used to some extent, and the scienter requirement has not been stressed.
The application of negligence and deceit has had its greatest influence in food cases.
PROSSER, TORTS § 85 (1941) ; Bohlen, Misrepresentation as Deceit, Negligence, or War-
ranty, 42 HARv. L. REv. 733 (1929); for an illuminating insight into the inconsistent
categorization of dangerous articles, see Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning,
15 U. OF CHI. L REv. 501 (1948). Evidentiary of the confused state of warranty law
is the prevailing tendency of the courts to hold that contributory negligence of the
customer is a defense to any action against the retailer or producer. Brown, The
Liability of Retail Dealers for Defective Food Products, 23 MINN. L. RExv. 585 (1939).
The well recognized contractual nature of warranties appears to have been overlooked
on this point. Even though the courts do not always call it contributory negligence,
negligence of the consumer usually defeats him even in a warranty action. See Note,
96 U. OF PA. L. REv. 863 (1948). A complete acceptance of a contractual theory would
avoid much of the present confusion. The term, contract, has been used to describe
three different combinations of things: "(1) The series of operative acts of the parties
expressing their assent, or some part of these acts; (2) a physical document . . .;
(3) the legal relations resulting from the operative acts of the parties, always includ-
ing the relation of right in one party and duty in the other." CoanIN, CoNTRAcrs § 3
(1952).
6. See EHRENZWEIG, NEGLIGENCE WITHOUT FAULT (1951), in which the author
traces and analyzes the development of tort law, emphasizing trends toward absolute
liability.
7. One of the early theories of negligence liability stemmed from the common
NOTES
liability for vendors of consumer goods.8 Each notion, however, estab-
lishes different boundary lines for vendors' responsibilities.9
Permeation of the common law with a philosophy favoring sellers
prevented a purely contractual approach to warranties. 10 That policy
was the very opposite of the current risk shifting trend.
The commercial transaction has undergone a gradual transition from
the face to face sale to the currently involved processes of distribu-
law notion that "a man acts at his peril." A slight variation of this position is the
entrepreneur theory of liability which imposes obligations as a result of doing business.
See HOLmES, THE COMMON LAW 82 (1881). Douglas presents an analysis of the
application of the current risk shifting philosophy in Vicarious Liability and Adminis-
tration of Risk 1, 38 YALE L.J. 584 (1929). Although this article deals with a con-
sideration of the workability of the theory in the field of vicarious liability, it offers
an excellent education in the hardships of application.
8. If the consumer has suffered damages as a result of an article previously
declared to be inherently dangerous, his recovery may be quite complete. If, however,
the product has not yet been placed in the dangerous category, prediction of decision
can be based on little more than a heartful hope. Russell, Manufacturer's Liability to
the Ultimate Consumer, 21 Ky. L.J. 388 (1933). This article presents a survey of
similar items which are considered inherently dangerous in one instance and not in
the other. The author suggests putting the entire matter on the theory of foresee-
ability and proximate cause.
The expansion of the contract remedy permits the buyer to extend his opportunity
for recovery through the warranties. This same advantage is available through the
device of considering the warranties to be freely imposed through social justice. It
will readily be observed that the choice of a proper form of recovery may determine
the buyer's success. It is difficult to be certain just how far a court will go in any
of these areas.
One other source of recovery is through the negligence per se statutes. These
statutes apply only to food and are reminiscent of early statutes in the law requiring
the distribution of food which is fit to eat. Noel, Products Liability of a Manufacturer
in Tennessee II, 22 TENN. L REv. 985 (1953).
9. The use of a combination of theories for a cause of action arising out of the
damages for a defective product makes the establishment of boundaries impossible.
The victim necessarily faces a problem of prediction, and the seller remains obscure as
to his area of liability. It is desirable, of course, to formulate a somewhat standard
form of liability which will be generally acceptable in order to clarify the rights and
duties of the parties involved.While a certain amount of flexibility may be desirable, a foundation of purely
social policy leaves the entire problem to be resolved by arbitrary distinction by the
formulators of a Code or entirely up to the discretion of the courts. The tort frame-
work carries the negligence law with it and presents the difficulty of proof. Even the
absolute liability extension of tort has involved questionable distinctions. Russell, supra
note 8.
10. The theory of caveat emptor was that the buyer purchased at his own risk.
Tiffany suggests that the rule is probably attributable to the fact that most sales took
place in market overt. TIFFANY, SALEs § 78 (2d ed. 1908). It follows that even though
the warranty may have been given some of the contract properties, a complete con-
tractual basis could not have been accepted.
In the period of the caveat emptor bloom, it was sometimes held that the inten-
tional nondisclosure of latent defects by the seller did not give rise to an action of
fraud. It was entirely a matter of caveat emptor. This rule has not usually been
applied to such a great extent in this country, but it is representative of the effects of
the caveat emptor doctrine on the early common law. Id. at §§ 54-55.
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tion.11 Growing judicial concern for unwary and often remote pur-
chasers has accompanied this transition. It may well be that an investiga-
tion would disclose that realistically the buyers' position has not
particularly changed. There is some merit, however, in the contention
that today's buyers are frequently more dependent on their sellers'
integrity than the primitive purchaser of a neighbor's horse.12 Increasing
complexity of products distribution cannot be discounted in the analysis
of the causes of caveat emptor's decline, although it does not completely
explain the changes which have occurred. 13
Judicial repudiation of the doctriie of caveat emptor may be largely
attributed to variations in social and commercial philosophies. An inquiry
into the effects of modern advertising techniques provides some insight
into this position.' 4 Manufacturers and dealers daily eulogize the qualities
11. Llewellyn traces the nature of sales from the primitive horse trade to the more
involved transactions of today. He also traces the theory, which is briefly sketched in
the following statement: "The progression is from 'any man in selling will affirm
that his wares are good' (arm's length), through 'one must not conceal what he knows,
or ought to know' (tort), into 'this is what he has agreed to deliver' (contract) ; then
into: this is what he must answer, generally for putting on the market (res ipsa loquitur
and third party warranty); and finally, into central regulation: he must, on pain of
exclusion or fine (guild or association) or confiscation, fine, or imprisonment (state),
show publicly the content of his ware; or even: wares of less than a given standard he
shall not Ptut out!" (emphasis theirs) Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality and .Society,
36 CoL. L. REv. 699, 713 (1936). See also Part II of this article, 37 COL. L. REV. 341
(1937).
12. The purchaser of a horse, traditionally considered to be representative of the
early sales, was not capable of discerning hidden defects in the animal. Perhaps the
standardization which is possible under modern methods of manufacturing renders the
buyer safer than he was in the early sales. Nevertheless, the relative positions of the
parties have altered. The consumer today may or may not be financially capable of
attempting an action at law against his seller. The present seller is usually in a position
of commercial advantage. Llewellyn observes the tendency of the courts to apply
different rules according to the transaction in mentioning that "the horse cases produce
horse-results, and the growth occurs in non-horse cases." Llewellyn, On Warraty of
Quality, and Society, 36 CoL. L. REy. 699, 711 n.39 (1936).
13. One reason given for the burial of caveat emptor is the development of a
business practice to stand behind a sale. VOLD, SALEs § 142 (1931). For a list of
products which are usually backed up by business practice and the types of warranties
which are usually given with them, see Bogert and Fink, Business Practice Regarding
Warranties in the Sale of Goods, 25 ILL. L. REv. 400 (1930). This article indicates
that business has taken the initiative and provided repair or replacement for defective
articles. The consumer's recovery does not seem to become complicated unless he
suffers personal or property damage as a result of the defect. The average business
man will realize that his reputation is improved by adopting the "customer-is always
right" attitude. The possibility of being held responsible for large financial losses,
however, presents a very different situation.
14. The total national expenditure for advertising in 1950 was over 52 billion
dollars. See Note, 6 VAND. L. RaV. 376 (1953). This 'national figure not only supports
a direct relationship between the manufacturer and the consumer, but it also represents
definite efforts by the seller to induce the potential purchaser to buy. A large per-
centage of newspaper space is devoted to advertising; most radio programs are com-
mercially sponsored; and the development of television has produced another great
means for cultivating a seller's market. Although much of the advertising may be
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of their products through diverse means of mass communication. This
exemplifies the current position of the seller in the distribution of his
products and justifies shifting the loss to him.'8 It would be a contra-
diction of logic to permit caveat emptor to play the dominant role in
this modern sales drama. The astounding proportions of insurance con-
sciousness in the field of product liability demonstrate the sellers' aware-
ness of their obligations.' 6
Development of this new policy favoring the buyer facilitated the
application of contractual concepts to warranty law.'7  Originally, the
contractual theory was limitedly manifest in the form of express war-
ranties.' 8 Further growth of the theory was revealed in the then slowly
expanding law of implied warranties. Adoption of the Uniform Sales
Act provided for universal application of such warranties but sanctioned
their utilization only in transactions accompanied by buyers' reliance on
considered as merely "puffing," a great deal of it goes beyond that stage, as in Meyer
v. Packard Cleveland Motor Co., 106 Ohio St. 328, 140 N.E. 118 (1922), where adver-
tising describing the quality of a truck, in the process of rebuilding when the contract
of sale was executed, gave the buyer a right of action even though the contract dis-
claimed any warranties.
15. Carhill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co., [1893] 1 Q.B. 256, involves a floating
promise directed to the world in general. This case implies a contract, much as in the
reward cases, as a result of extensive advertising campaigns. A similar result in tort,
on the theory of a representation to the world at large, is found in Roberts v. Anheuser-
Busch Brewing Ass'n, 211 Mass. 449, 98 N.E. 95 (1912). Waite points out that these
results are usually confined to the food cases; he asserts that "no sound reason appears
why it should be so limited." WAITE, SALES 201 (2d ed. 1938).
16. Over $18,000,000 are spent annually for products liability insurance in this
country. See Noel, stepra note 8. This figure certainly indicates a recognition of liability
by people in business. Consumer realization of recovery seems to be dependent, to
some extent, on a claims consciousness environment. An analysis of 38,000 claims,
including food and other products, made by a products liability insurance expert
revealed that 671%% of all claims came from the New York metropolitan area; 12Y27%
came from the Boston area; and 20% came from the rest of the country. This con-
centrated area of recovery has also accounted for higher premium rates. DIcxEsON,
PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND THE FOOD CONSUMER 249 (1951).
17. Cohen's analysis of the justification of the contract law is divided into six
different theories: (1) the sanctity of promises, which simply recognizes something
inherently wrong with breaking a promise; (2) the will theory, based on the will of
the parties; (3) the injurious-reliance theory; (4) the equivalent theory, fourided on a
quid pro quo sentiment; (5) formalism in contract, supported by historical respect for
forms and ceremonies; and (6) on a distribution of risk theory. COHEN, LAW AND
TE SOCIAL ORDER 88 (1933). It will be noticed that each of these theories involves the
promise ingredient and a remedy for breach of that promise. The result of the appli-
cation of one of these theories, even though the basic ingredients remain the same,
cannot avoid determining the bounds of the law.
18. Warranties were based only on affirmations or promises made by a seller.
If the goods were specified, and no express statements were made, there was no pro-
vision that they must be of any particular quality. The common law was developing
an implied warranty in the later cases, and the Uniform Sales Act provided for this
type of warranty. 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 231 (3d ed. 1948). For a list of states which
have enacted the Uniform Sales Act, see BRAucHER, SUTHERLAND AND WILLCOX, COM-
mFRcIAL TRANSACTIONS xii (1953).
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words of description. 19 That statute's sections contain elements of tort
principles, but the development of implied agreements appears to have
been primarily a contractual enlargement.2 0 The limited provisions of
the Sales Act were extended by judicial interpretation which, in turn,
depicts greater acceptance of this ideology.
Perhaps a contractually based law will not solve all warranty prob-
lems. In such instances it may be necessary to reach a decision on purely
social considerations. The possibility exists that the very pattern of
contract into which warranties have been fitted may essentially represent
nothing more than a solution by social policy.2 ' Certainly this concept
has been expanded by social considerations. Explicit adoption of a con-
tractual basis of liability would, however, standardize responsibility for
breaches of warranty.
The Uniform Commercial Code seems to have imbued warranties
with more contractual characteristics than existed under interpretations
of the Sales Act.2 2 The proposed codification contains affirmative implied
warranty sections which require the goods in any transaction to be fit for
19. Section 15 of the Uniform Sales Act introduces the implied warranties of
quality in the following manner: "Subject to the provisions of this act and of any
statute in that behalf, there is no implied warranty or condition as to the quality or
fitness for any particular purpose of goods supplied under a contract to sell or a sale,
except as follows. . . ." The implied warranties which are provided in this section are:
(1) a warranty of fitness for particular purpose if the buyer conveys his intended
purpose and relies on the seller to choose a suitable product; and (2) a warranty of
merchantability if the goods are bought by description.
20. Few agree on whether the basis of the law of warranty in the Sales Act is
contractual or tortious. The element of reliance which may be found in the provisions
sounds of both contract and tort. The use of the word "affirmation" in Section 12,
concerning the express warranty, suggests that something less than a promise is
required. This confusion has been responsible for a great deal of variation in the
damages which have been recoverable for a breach of warranty. Waite applies the
contractual standard; Vold applies the tort standard. Amram and Goodman, Some
Problems in the Law of Implied Warrmtaies, 2-3 SYRAcusE L. REV. 259 (1950-52).
The indecision concerning the basis of liability also causes problems in relation to a
wrongful death suit. If the court decides that warranties are contract actions, this
type of recovery may he barred. This simply illustrates another element in the buyer's
choice of a suitable cause of action. See Note, 96 U. oF PA. L. REv. 863, 869 n.42
(1948).
21. The argument that the expansion of contract to adequately cover the warranty
area is merely a device by which to express social policy certainly has merit. Dean
Pound views absolute liability in torts and artificially included phrases in contracts
as steps toward the service state. He stresses the importance of keeping promises and
maintains that this obligation has been considerably altered by modern courts and
legislatures. Pound, Law in the Service State, 36 A.B.A.J. 977 (1950). On the other
hand, the implied warranty or promise that goods will be of a minimum standard would
not seem to be completely artificial.
22. The Uniform Commercial Code represents a joint effort by the American Law
Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Law. Article
Two is a Codification of Sales Law. Unless otherwise indicated, the use of the word
Code in this text refers to the 1952 Official Draft. The only state which has enacted
the Code as law, at the time of this writing, is Pennsylvania.
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ordinary use. Nevertheless, many code provisions depicit a continued
search for a basis of liability.
2 3
Warranties and Disclaimers.
The most significant pertinent contribution of the Commercial Code
is inclusion of the warranty of correspondence with description within
the express warranty section; it was an implied warranty under the Sales
Act.24 Older cases condoned application of this latter warranty only
to sales in which the buyer purchased an article without opportunity to
actually see it and, therefore, in reliance on the vendor's description.25
Inclusion of a provision in the same section that goods must also con-
form to an examined sample supports this interpretation.26 A number
of the more recent cases, however, have extended the meaning of warranty
of correspondence with description by requiring the product in any sale
to be essentially the subject matter bargained for.27 Philosophically, this
criterion may be based on the proposition that any product is defined by
the purposes associated with it.28 An artifact involves several qualities
of the product, the most important being its utility.2 9 The purchase of
a ladder infers a reliance on the part of the buyer that the ladder may
23. The language in Section 2-313 still indicates that an affirmation or promise
may give rise to an express warranty. The implied warranty of fitness for particular
purpose, Section 2-315, still requires reliance, which may be indicative of contract or
tort.
24. Section 14 of the Sales Act provided an implied warranty of correspondence
with description. Section 2-313 (1) (b) of the Code makes this an express warranty
if the description is made a basis of the bargain. Comment 4 to this Section explains
the intended scope of this new express warranty: "In view of the principle that the
whole purpose of the law of warranty is to determine what it is that the seller has
agreed to sell, the policy is adopted of those cases which refuse except in unusual
circumstances to recognize a material deletion of the seller's obligation. Thus, a
contract is normally a contract for a sale of something describable and described."
25. 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 224 (3d ed. 1948).
26. ". . . [A]nd if the contract or sale be by sample, as well as by description, it is
not sufficient that the bulk of the goods corresponds with the sample if the goods do
not also correspond with the description." UNIFORM SALES AcT § 14.
27. The comments to Section 37 of the Uniform Revised Sales Act (1944), which
dealt with the express warranty and is now Section 2-313 of the Code, suggests that
the vitality of this new express warranty is based on that case law which has refused
to permit a disclaimer to destroy the essence of the sale. J. B. Colt Co. v. Bridges,
162 Ga. 154, 132 S.E. 889 (1926), maintains the implied warranty as one imposed by
law, and therefore it cannot be disclaimed. The cases of Smith v. Oscar H. Will &
Co., 51 N.D. 357, 199 N.W. 861 (1924), and F. C. Austin v. Tillman Co., 104 Ore.
541, 209 Pac. 131 (1922), are mentioned for finding some fundamental subject-matter
of the contract which a disclaimer cannot undercut.
28. "In the field of purposive human activity ... value and being are not two
different things, but two aspects of an integral reality." FULLER, THE LAw IN QUEST
OF ITSELF 11 (1940).
29. For an analysis of definition in the sphere of logic, see HARTMAN, FUNDA-
MENTALS OF LOGIC 5 (2d ed. 1949).
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be employed satisfactorily for the purposes for which ladders are ordi-
narily used.30  The Code adopts this interpretation by suggesting that
every transaction is a sale by description as regards its very essence; the
essence of the sale would be a normally usable ladder.31 It is certainly
sound contract law to imply a promise that the article purchased will con-
form to the normal conception of that article. Perhaps this simple con-
tractual formula is the primary basis of liability which has long eluded
warranty law.
This new express warranty of correspondence with description may
appear to have done little more than exchange the adjective implied for
express, until it is observed that "express warranty," as used in the Code,
cannot be disclaimed. 32 This provision gives the new warranty vigor
for a dynamic life. Heretofore, case law has usually permitted an
implied warranty to be disclaimed through utilization of explicit lan-
guage.3 3 However, the trend of cases, followed by the Code, has been
30. Llewellyn's study reveals that numbers of courts have been seeing that "descrip-
tion" goes to the essence of a bargain. He points out that there is a very good case
to be made for Section 14 in the Sales Act as an "iron section." By this it is meant
that no agreement could upset it, and it would require that the essence of the bargain
be complied with. Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality, and Society, 37 COL. L. RV.
341, 385 (1937).
31. Historically, this type of safeguard was provided by a condition of correspond-
ence with description in the English Sale of Goods Act, 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 223 a
(3d ed. 1948). Rescission was provided for a breach of this condition, although it was
not permitted for breaches of warranty. This particular rescission problem has not
existed under the Sales Act in this country; rescission is expressly provided in the
event of a breach of warranty. UNIFORM SALES Acr § 69. The election of remedies,
however, has contributed an equally perplexing problem.
The English treatment of this obligation as a condition is important as a source
of analogy. The condition in the English act would amount to a promise under the
application of Corbin's analysis of condition. He contends that conditions, in the true
sense, include only a "fact of event on which some legal duty is dependent." CORBIN,
CONTRACTS § 634 (1952). The possibility of a breach of condition is denied; only a
promise may be breached. This interpretation of the English condition correlates with
the tendency of some recent cases in this country to enlarge the Sales Act warranty
of correspondence with description into a required ingredient of every transaction. The
Code appears to have adopted this construction of the warranty.
32. "If the agreement creates an express warranty, words disclaiming it are inopera-
tive." UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316 (1). Comment 4 to Section 2-313, which
establishes the express warranty, also indicates that the express warranty may not
be disclaimed. It will be recalled that the express warranty now includes the warranty
of correspondence with description. See note 24 supra.
33. The use of the words "as is" or "excluding all warranties, expressed or
implied" usually disclaims all warranties, and the courts give them effect. See Note, 1
VAND. L. REv. 467 (1948). The case of Garofalo Co. v. St. Mary's Packing Co.,
339, Ill. App. 412, 90 N.E.2d 292 (1950), held that the words "as is" covered not only
the admittedly damaged cans, in a shipment of cases of tomato juice, but also included
the contents of the cans. A disclaimer using the words "in lieu of . . . all other
obligations or liabilities" was recently held to include even negligence. Shafer v. Reo
Motors, Inc., 205 F.2d 685 (3d Cir. 1953). Many courts, on the other hand, have been
reluctant to permit a disclaimer to completely eliminate the essence of the sale. Three
devices used in avoiding harsh disclaimer provisions are: (1) calling the warranty a
NOTES
to refuse to recognize any attempted disclaimer of an express warranty.34
The Code has, therefore, provided a new express warranty which requires
an unretractable essential conformance of the agreement's object.
Is this a limitation on the right of contractual freedom? 35 The
value of the warranty could be completely destroyed if the Code freely
permitted the seller to avoid it.6 Any other position overlooks the
bargaining positions of the parties. A buyer whose bargaining power
equals that of his vendor would not purchase a, ladder if the seller openly
stated that he refused to be liable if the ladder did not perform the usual
functions for which a ladder is ordinarily purchased. Prohibiting dis-
claimer of the new express warranty thus protects the right to contract.
To permit the seller to disclaim the very essence of the sale is to devitalize
the contractual concept.
Although the Code proscribes a disclaimer of an express warranty,
it recognizes limitation of remedy by agreement of the parties.37 The
sales agreement may restrict compensation for losses arising from a
defective article to replacement or repair unless personal injuries are
involved ;38 any limitation of consequential damages for such personal
harm is prima facie unconscionable. 39 The same is not true, however,
condition; (2) saying that warranties arise by implication of law, and therefore cannot
be contracted away; and (3) simply maintaining the warranty on the grounds of
public policy. See Note, 23 MINN. L. REv. 784 (1939). Prosser states that courts
have required the goods to be at least warranted genuine according to description,
even in the face of a disclaimer. Prosser, The Imnplied Warranty of Merchantable
Quality, 27 MINN. L. REv. 117, 160 (1943). Linn v. Radio Center Delicatessen, Inc.,
9 N.Y.S.2d 110 (N. Y. Munic. Ct., 1939), held that it was against public policy for
a manufacturer of food products to disclaim; the Garofalo case, supra, is to the con-
trary. See also Ferguson v. Koch, 204 Cal. 342, 268 Pac. 342 (1928), which holds
that even though the warranties are disclaimed, the article must still be of the essential
character intended.
34. The view has been expressed that an express warranty and a disclaimer nullify
each other. Alaska Pacific Salmon Co. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 163 F.2d 643 n.33
(2d Cir. 1947). But see Fairbanks, Morse & Co. v. Consolidated Fisheries Co., 190
F.2d 817, 822 (3d Cir. 1951). In the latter case the court referred to Section 2-316 (1)
of the Uniform Commercial Code which affirmatively states that an express warranty
cannot be disclaimed. The court says the Code, even though not enacted in most of
the states, deserves the same consideration that the restatements receive.
For a discussion of the manner in which the Code handles the parol evidence rule,
see Note, 53 CoL. L. Rxv. 858 (1953).
35. See note 21 supra.
36. It is unlikely that business enterprises would engage in wholesale disclaimer of
any obligations; nevertheless, the possibility is a dangerous one. The same result might
practically be reached through making minor warranties for repair while negating any
other possible type of recovery.
37. UNIFORM CoMMERcIAL CODE § 2-719. This Section states that "the measure of
damages recoverable under this article" may be limited "to return of the goods and
repayment of the price or to repair and replacement of non-conforming goods or parts."
38. UNIFORM CommERcIAL CODE § 2-719 (3).
39. The problem which is created by this Section is the meaning of the words
"prima facie unconscionable." Comment 1 declares that "it is of the very essence of a
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when a property loss occurs. 40 This distinction appears to be entirely
arbitrary and illustrates the tendency of the courts to distinguish between
personal and property injury. This is exemplified by the liberal attitude
toward recovery in food cases, as contrasted with notions of restricted
recovery in cases involving other products.4 1 The only reasonable ex-
planation must be based on social policy; it is nearly certain that
deleterious food, if consumed, will cause a bodily injury. The Code
advances a step by realizing that bodily injury may also be caused by
other defective goods.42 It has, however, chosen to draw the line between
personal and property harms. A contractual approach to the damages
question does not sanction such a dividing line.43 Any seller is reasonably
capable of foreseeing either type of injury resulting from the improper
performance of his product. 44 If it is agreed that the essence of the
sale must be delivered, compensation for any harm, personal or property,
arising because of the defect should be recoverable.
sales contract that at least minimum adequate remedies be available." The interpreta-
tion of the courts will determine the effectiveness of this provision. If this section is
liberally construed for the seller, he may not only avoid property damages but might,
in some instances, overcome the prima facie presumption against limitation of personal
damages. Contrarily, if the judicial interpretation favors the buyer, he may win not
only personal damages but might also demonstrate that some limitations on property
losses are unreasonable.
40. "Limitation of consequential damages for injury to the person in the case of
consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable but limitation of damages where the loss
is commercial is not." UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-719 (3).
41. The food cases represent, in many ways, a separate area of warranty law.
DIcKERSON, PRODTcs LIABILITY AND THE FOOD CoNsUMER (1951), is a very compre-
hensive treatment of the food problem. The author points out that the consumer who
is injured by defective food has four possible modes of recovery: (1) implied war-
ranty of fitness or merchantability in all states; (2) a special food warranty in some
states; (3) negligence in all states; and (4) the pure food statutes in some states.
Id. at 76. Recovery has been permitted much more freely in each of these actions in
cases concerning food. Although food dealers have been held rather strictly liable,
restaurant owners have fared much better in the case law. They have often escaped
liability on the contention that a sale has not been completed. The Code settles this
problem by stating that "the serving for value of food or drink to be consumed either
on the premises or elsewhere is a sale." UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314 (1). Prosser
suggests seven reasons for the difference in food: (1) the probability of defect in the
class of goods; (2) the magnitude and extent of social harm; (3) the kind of interest
threatened-personal or property; (4) the ability of the consumer to protect himself;
(5) the necessity of consumer to trade in such products; (6) the cost of inspection by
the vendor; and (7) the customs of the business. PRossER, ToRTs § 83 (1941); Note,
96 U. OF PA. L. REv. 863 (1948).
42. No distinction is made in § 2-719 of the Code between personal injury resulting
from defects in food products and those arising out of other defective products.
43. "In cases where the defendant's breach of contract has resulted in the injury
or destruction of specific property belonging to the plaintiff, the courts have usually
felt little difficulty in finding that the defendant should have foreseen the injury."
5 CORBIN, CoNTRAcTs § 1013 (1951).
44. The seller of a ladder is certainly capable of contemplating the possible dam-
ages which may be caused if the ladder is defective. The very nature of the article
conveys its intended use.
NOTES
The remedy provided for any type of injury is effective only insofar
as adequate causes of action are available. The Sales Act remedies for
breach of warranty consisted of four alternative causes of action. Elec-
tion of one barred the use of any of the others, obviously eliminating
the possibility of a suit for both rescission and. damages. Remedies for
nonperformance, on the other hand, offered full recovery for damages
for breach of contract.45 This distinction failed to recognize that harm
resulting from breach of warranty might be equally (or more) severe
than nonperformance by the seller. The Code makes a distinction be-
tween nondelivered and accepted goods but apparently allows rescission
and damages in either case;46 this combination of damages is desirable.
The manner in which the Code treats other warranties accentuates
the importance of the new express warranty. Implied warranties of
merchantability and fitness remain subject to disclaimer and have
encountered only minor changes. 47 The express warranty by affirmation
or promise appears to be covered either by the implied promise of the
new express warranty of correspondence with description as to the essence
of the sale or by general contract reliance principles as to agreements
beyond the mere essence.48 The purposes of these warranties would seem
to be adequately served by the new express warranty, which demands
that the goods be at least merchantable in any sale. Overlapping of
these sections indicates that the Code has not given breach of warranty
a firmly established theory of liability.
45. UNIFORM SALES AcT § 67. The buyer has the right to "maintain an action
against the seller for damages for nondelivery. The measure of damages is the loss
directly and naturally resulting in the ordinary course of events, from the seller's breach
of contract." Although the word "rescission" is not used, in effect the buyer is pro-
vided with an opportunity to consider the contract breached and sue for damages.
46. Section 2-713 gives the buyer's damages for nondelivery. "The measure of
damages is the difference between the price current at the time the buyer learned of the
breach and the contract price together with the incidental and consequential damages."
Section 2-714 concerns the buyer's damages for breach in regard to accepted goods.
"The measure of damages . .. is the difference at the time and place of acceptance
between the value of the goods accepted and the value they would have had if they had
been as warranted, unless special circumstances show proximate damages of a different
amount." There is no requirement of an election of remedies in either category.
47. The implied warranty of merchantability in the Code, Section 2-314, arises in
every sale. Section 15 (2) of the Sales Act was a little more complicated, but the new
Code Section simply codifies the trend in interpretation of this warranty. Section 2-315,
concerning the implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose, has been reworded
but has entirely the same elements as Section 15 (1) of the Sales Act, with the excep-
tion that it is no longer limited by the patent or other trade name restriction. See UNI-
FOnt CoMMERCIAL CODE § 2-315, Comment 5.
48. UNIFORM SALEs Acr § 12; UNIFORM CoMMERcIAL CODE § 2-313 (1). Both
express warranty Sections use the words promise or affirmation, and there are no sig-
nificant changes generally in this warranty.
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Privity.
Privity is probably the most controversial issue involved in a dis-
cussion of warranty law.4 9 The most notable change in the Code regard-
ing privity is a provision that a member or guest of the purchaser's
household, who is injured by use of a defective product, shall have a
direct cause of action against the seller.50 Heretofore, the common law
has often denied recovery in such situations except to the immediate pur-
chaser. 51 The major consumer today is the family unit, and the actual
purchaser is merely its representative. There is no basis for assuming
that the buyer who carries the product away will be the sole user or
consumer; members of the family unit eat the food, ride in the auto-
49. The consideration of warranties as contractual in nature has brought about the
privity problem in this area of the law. Although it is difficult to understand, privity
has even plagued attempted recoveries on a negligence theory. The negligence law has
largely eliminated this restriction by the wide following of the case of MacPherson v.
Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916) ; see Note, 12 OHIo STATE L.J.
142 (1951). The courts have used several means of avoiding the privity barrier in
warranty actions: (1) warranties considered as running with the product, Coca-Cola
Bottling Works v. Lyons, 145 Miss. 876, 111 So. 305 (1927) ; (2) a third party bene-
ficiary theory, Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino, 27 Ohio App. 275, 161 N.E. 557 (1928);
(3) the theory that the middleman is an agent, Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores,
255 N.Y. 388, 175 N.E. 105 (1931); (4) an assignment theory, Madouras v. Kansas
City Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 230 Mo. App. 275, 90 S.W.2d 445 (1936) ; and (5) on the
theory of public policy. See Feezer Manufacturer's Liability for Injuries Caused by
His Products: Defective Automobiles, 37 MicH. L. REv. 1 (1938). For a general
survey of the privity problem and the reaction of the courts and the authorities towards
this problem, see Bohlen, Liability of Manufacturer to Persons Other Than Their
Immediate Vendees, 45 L.Q. Rv. 343 (1929) ; Dean and Warfield, Should the Doctrine
of Implied Warranties Be Limited to Sales Transactions?, 2 VAND. L. REv. 675 (1948-
49); Jeanblanc, Manufacturer's Liability to Persons Other Than Their Immediate
Vendees, 24 VA. L. REv. 134 (1937); Worth, Requirement of Priity, 30 N.C.L. R-v.
191 (1952); Note, 29 B.U.L. REv. 107 (1949); Note, INTRAmURAL L. REV. (N.Y.U.) 25
(1945).
50. UNIFORM CommERCIAL CODE § 2-318. Section 43 of the Uniform Revised Sales
Act, which has been replaced by Section 2-318 in the Code, provided an almost complete
departure from privity. "A warranty extends to any natural person whose relationship to
the buyer is such as to make it reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume or
be affected by the goods and who is injured in Person or property by breach of the war-
ranty." Hence, if a manufacturer sold to a retailer, it would be reasonable for the
manufacturer to expect that the consumer will eventually use the article. So the con-
sumer could sue the manufacturer. This extension of the manufacturer's liability would
have encompassed most of the cases involving consumer damages. Buerger, The Sales
Article of the Uniform Commercial Code, 23 N.Y.S. BAR Ass'N BULL. 116 (1951).
Williston expresses concern over an extension of this nature; he suggests that "it is at
least questionable whether the law should not remain as is, unless the seller is guilty
of negligence or the goods are inherently dangerous," Williston, The Law of Sales in
the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code, 63 HARV. L. REV. 561 (1950).
51. Gearing v. Berkson, 223 Mass. 257, 111 N.E. 785 (1916), illustrates this privity
restriction. The wife purchased pork chops from the grocer; she and her husband were
injured as a result of eating them. The husband was successful in his suit against the
grocer; it was held that the wife made the purchase as his agent. The wife did not
win her suit against the grocer because there was no privity. Section 2-318 would give
the wife an adequate remedy.
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mobile, and play the radio. The seller cannot avoid being aware of that
fact. Furthermore, the members and guests of the household are entitled
to rely on the general quality of his product. This leads to the con-
clusion that the vendor should be directly liable to the consumer who
is injured through its use. It is not unreasonable to imply a promise
by the seller for the benefit of such persons that the article is merchant-
able. This seems to be an appropriate extension of the contractual theory.
The original third-party beneficiary section, as first drafted in the
Revised Sales Act, which was the first attempted revision of the Sales
Act, provided that consumers had a direct cause of action for both prop-
erty and personal damage. The Code now allows third-party recovery
only in the event of personal injury.52 The sole reason suggested for
this change is the insurance possibilities. 53 The distinction seems to be
rather arbitrary and illustrates the lack of definite boundaries in the
application of warranty law. A continued reluctance to provide complete
and logical recovery is apparent. This is precisely the same type limita-
tion as that provided in the disclaimer limitation section and apparently
is also founded on the food cases in which personal injury is almost
certain. The distinction can be explained by the codifiers' willingness
to apply a risk distribution theory only in cases involving personal injury.
The contractual theory, which requires performance of the essence of
the contract, would permit no such distinction.
The most annoying problem created by the privity doctrine has been
completely avoided in the Code. Assume that a purchaser buys a sleeping
blanket from a retailer, and a defect in it causes it to break into flames,
52. UNIFORM REVIsED SALEs Acr § 43. The third-party consumer might conceivably
still make an argument for property damages. Section 2-715 of the Code provides conse-
quential damages for any "injury to person or property proximately resulting from any
breach of warranty." Why should the recovery for a third-party beneficiary be any
different? The deletion of property damage from Section 2-318 would, nevertheless,
indicate that a change was intended, eliminating this recovery for property damage.
53. TRANScIUPr OF DIscussioN ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCrAL CODE 329 (Joint
Meeting, The American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Law, May 1950).
Although the meaning of "insurance possibilities" is not explicit from this tran-
script, the codifiers were apparently troubled by the extensive insurance coverage sellers
would be compelled to have in order to indemnify themselves. This possibility cannot be
refuted; nevertheless, it does not seem that this justifies leaving the burden of loss on
the consumer. For a discussion of the bankruptcy -hazard, particularly in the case of
marginal industries, see Note, 26 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 352 (1951). It is generally con-
sidered, however, that insurance will sufficiently handle the problem and that privity
may be eliminated without causing great hardships. See Note, 37 COL. L. REv. 77, 81
n.26 (1937).
Soia Mentschikoff, Associate Chief Reporter, comments concerning the elimination
of property damages: "I, myself, have always thought of it as a compromise solution
between those persons who urged that there be relatively unlimited extension to third
party beneficiaries, and those persons who thought that there should be no extension what-
soever." (Communication to INDIANA LAW JOURNAL).
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injuring the purchaser. 54 It is very likely that the retailer would not be
liable because he had no opportunity to discover the defect.55 Inspection
in this type of case would require destruction of the product. Even
though the retailer should be held liable, he may be insolvent or virtually
so. In addition, the majority of cases deny the consumer the right to
maintain an action against the wholesaler or manufacturer.56 On the
other hand, a long line of food cases hold the retailer liable in the case
of products which cannot be subjected to inspection; many of the food
cases also allow the consumer to jump privity by suing the manufacturer,
although there is a sprinkling of cases to this effect concerning other
products. 57  Once again, it does not seem that the distinction can be
justified.
The Revised Sales Act had several sections which would have
largely solved the privity problem. These sections are of present im-
portance only because they offer an opportunity to investigate the most
pronounced weakness of the contractual approach. Section 40 imposed an
implied warranty of safe resale on a manufacturer who sold to a whole-
saler or retailer if it was reasonable to assume that the product was
being purchased for resale purposes. 58 Two procedural sections were
54. Wood v. General Electric Co., 112 N.E.2d 8 (Ohio 1953), involves a defective
sleeping blanket which caused property damage. The consumer failed to recover on an
implied warranty because there was no privity. The reference to this fact situation in
the text has been extended into a hypothetical case for the benefit of illustration. The
Revised Sales Act would have solved this problem but the Code retreated from its early
position. See Note 50 supra.
55. Scruggins v. Jones, 207 Ky. 636, 269 S.W. 743 (1925); co tra Ward v. Great
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 231 Mass. 90, 120 N.E. 225 (1918). For a discussion of
these cases and the general liability of the retailer, see Waite, Retail Responsibility and
Judicial Law Making, 34 MICH. L. Ray. 494 (1936).
56. The privity requirement will usually hinder the consumer's action against the
manufacturer and the wholesaler. DICKERSON, op. cit. supra note 41, at 142, demonstrates
that the wholesaler is the most elusive member in the chain of distribution. He exempli-
fies this by pointing out that Missouri has eliminated privity as concerns the manufacturer
but not the wholesaler. DeGouveia v. Lee Mercantile Co., 231 Mo. App. 447, 100 S.W.2d
336 (1936).
57. Waite, supra note 55, at 510; Note, 96 U. OF PA. L. REv. 863 (1948). Waite
points out that cases holding the retailer and cases jumping privity are usually food
cases. Waite is very much against holding the retailer liable in this type of situation.
This position is criticized in Brown, The Liability of Retail Dealers for Defective
Products, 23 MINN. L. Rav. 585 (1939); Waite, Retail Responsibility-A Reply, 23
MINN. L. REv. 612 (1939), offers a response to this criticism. On the basis of theory,
Waite's views are probably more accurate. As a practical matter, however, Brown's
position permits a recovery, which is generally desirable.
Cases involving products other than food which permit the jumping of privity man-
age to grant recovery on negligence, instead of warranty, in order to justify the outcome.
Huset v. J. I. Case Threshing Machine Co., 120 Fed. 865 (8th Cir. 1903); Baxter v.
Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409 (1932). See Notes, 7 FORD L. REV. 456
(1938) ; 12 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 362 (1938).
58. UNIFORm REvisED SALES ACT § 40 (1944).
NOTES
provided to facilitate the operation of this warranty.59 One provided
that the retailer could implead his seller and that this procedure could
be employed up to and including the manufacturer. The other section
granted the consumer a direct cause of action against the manufacturer
if he was liable to impleader under the warranty of resale. 0 The act
apparently adopted the view that the manufacturer impliedly warrants
his products to be at least merchantable and carried this warranty to the
consumer through the safe resale section. The retailer and other mem-
bers of the process of distribution could be involved procedurally in this
attempt to accomplish a recovery for the consumer. This proposal would
not directly conflict with one authority's opinion that the retailer, who
is unable to discover the defect, should not be held liable., 1 A conflict
would of course still be possible since the retailer's liability would not
be less in the event of an insolvent manufacturer or wholesaler. At this
point, it becomes evident that a contractual solution is difficult. While
it is not extremely difficult to hold the manufacturer contractually liable
for his product, there is less justification for retailer responsibility in
the absence of an opportunity to examine the goods.
Perhaps it is impossible to solve the privity problem with contract
principles. The final determination of liability in this area of the problem
may inevitably depend on risk shifting considerations.6 2 It would not
be a simple matter, however, to apply this concept successfully. The
party to whom the risk is shifted might be unable to bear the burden
of risk. If he is insolvent, the desired social end, protection of the con-
sumer, would remain unaccomplished. The contractual rationale, accept-
ing its deficiencies in this area, still seems to be capable of establishing
the best defined basis of liability. To imply a promise, by each of the
parties involved, that the product will perform its usual purposes does
not appear to be an unbearable strain on contractual principles. The re-
tailer or wholesaler, even though incapable of inspecting the article, must
59. UNrFoR RmvsED SAr.s Acr § 120 (1944), provided for impleader by the buyer,
which would have enabled the retailer to implead his seller. UNrFORM REMsED SALES
Ac § 121 (1944), established a direct cause of action against a prior seller; this would
have enabled the consumer to sue the manufacturer directly if the latter was subject to
the warranty of safe resale under Section 40.
60. The right of impleader has successfully been accomplished in some jurisdictions
outside of the warranty area. The New York third-party practice statutes and Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 14 permit this type of procedure. For a brief discussion of this
approach, see Note, 24 A.L.R. 906 (1921). Davis v. Radford, 233 N.C. 283, 63 S'.E.2d 822
(1951) also reaches a similar result.
61. See note 55 mtpra.
62. See note 7 stpra. Imperative in the risk shifting approach to the problem. is
a systematic organization of liability which will facilitate risk distribution. In one case
the manufacturer may be capable of shifting the risk; in another case, the reverse may
be true. The same is true concerning the retailer and the wholesaler.
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realize that the purchaser relies on him, as well as the manufacturer,
to deliver the essence of the sale.
It is unfortunate that the Code has retreated from this problem.6 3
It might have worked out the parties' rights in this area as clearly as
it diagrammed the rights involved in security transactions.64 Perhaps the
absence of such sections indicates that the codifiers did not feel that a
socially acceptable and legally expedient basis of liability could be estab-
lished at this time. The problem certainly requires a consideration of
the social desirability of affording consumer protection to this extent.
It involves a consideration of risk shifting and distribution. The complex
chain of distribution and the phenomenal amount of advertising in
modern commercial practice renders the antiquated privity restriction
inappropriate. Drafters of the Code, even though they did not accept
proposals which would have completely eliminated the privity problem,
should have established the manufacturer's, wholesaler's, and retailer's
responsibilities. One of the most confused areas of commercial law has
been entirely ignored.
The warranties, although divided into several specific types, are
essentially an attempt to provide that the essence of the contract must
be performed. The new express warranty of correspondence with
description, properly interpreted, should fulfill this function without
assistance from other warranties. The limitation on the seller, which
makes it impossible for him to disclaim this warranty, strengthens its
potentiality. The remedies, also taking a more consistent contractual
form, have become broader and more equitable. Even the privity prob-
lem has been eliminated in one particular situation.
Much of the confusion which exists in the law of warranties might
well be attributed to a failure to perceive the contractual concepts in-
volved. This failure may be largely ascribed to the social philosophy of
caveat emptor. A shift in social thinking has effected a change which
facilitates a solution based on an increased application of contractual prin-
ciples to warranty problems.
63. Joint Meeting of the Codifiers of the Code, op. cit. supra note 53, at 328, indi-
cates that the meat packing industry was strongly opposed to these sections. It was
considered impossible for the Code to be enacted in Illinois, and probably in other states,
with these provisions included. The sections were not eliminated at this meeting, but
it is likely that they were deleted because of this type of opposition. Miss Mentschikoff,
in the transcript, observes that the negligence field has largely eliminated the privity
problem, and she suggests that it would be desirable for the Code to affirmatively elimi-
nate these privity difficulties.
64. The Code has attempted to establish definite lines of rights of the parties by
settling which class of creditors prevails in various situations. UNIFORM COMMcIA.
CODE §§ 9-301-9-318. For a discussion of this article of the Code, see Kripke, The
Modernization of Commnercial Security Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 183 (1951).
